
















Resumo		Neste	artigo,	pretendo	apresentar	uma	nova	interpretação	da	desobediência	civil	 com	 o	 objetivo	 de	 revelar	 seu	 potencial	 na	 construção	 de	 uma	democracia	 radical	 anticapitalista.	 Depois	 de	 discutir	 as	 diferenças	 entre	poder	constituinte	e	desinstituinte,	ambos	ativados	pela	desobediência	civil,	o	 estudo	 conclui	 indicando	 algumas	 características	 e	 formas	 de	desobediência	 civil	 que	 podem	 ser	 vistas	 como	 exemplos	 de	 um	 poder	constituinte	e	desinstituinte.	
Palavras-chave:	Desobediência	 civil,	 Estado	 de	 exceção	 econômico,	 Poder	constituinte,	Poder	desinstituinte,	Democracia	radical.	
	
Abstract	In	this	paper,	I	aim	to	present	a	new	interpretation	of	civil	disobedience	with	the	objective	of	revealing	its	potential	in	the	construction	of	an	anti-capitalist	radical	democracy.	After	discussing	the	differences	between	constituent	and	dis-instituting	power,	both	of	which	are	activated	by	civil	disobedience,	 the	study	concludes	by	 indicating	some	of	 the	characteristics	and	forms	of	civil	disobedience	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 images	 of	 constituent	 and	 dis-instituting	power.	





Constituent/dis-instituting	power		 This	text	is	intended	to	develop	the	idea	of	civil	disobedience	as	a	meeting	point	between	constituent	power	and	dis-instituting	power.	This	study	will	examine	the	relationship	between	these	two	traditions	from	a	new	angle,	 in	order	to	deepen	the	current	critique	of	–	and	fight	against	–	capitalism.	It	is	important	to	note	at	this	stage	that	my	use	of	the	term	‘dis-instituting	power’	differs	both	from	Agamben’s	“destituent	potential”	(potenza	destituente)	and	Rafaelle	Laudani’s	 “destituent	 power”	 (potere	 destituente).	 In	 the	 introduction	 to	 Disobedience	 in	
Western	Political	Thought:	A	Genealogy	 it	 is	made	 clear	 that	Laudani’s	 concept	of	destituent	power	 bears	 no	 relation	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 civil	 disobedience.	 In	 fact,	 he	 classifies	 this	tradition,	 originating	 in	 the	 1970s,	 as	 a	 “mistake”,	 a	 mere	 liberal	 attempt	 at	 limiting	 and	taming	destituent	power.	Moreover,	 Laudani	 admits	 that	his	 concept	of	 destituent	power	 is	not	hostile	 towards	existing	 institutions	of	 the	current	political-legal	order,	classifying	 it	not	as	 anti-institutional,	 but	 rather	 as	 extra-institutional.	 There	 are,	 therefore,	 two	 important	differences	 to	 be	 highlighted	 between	 the	 proposition	 set	 out	 in	 this	 study	 and	 Laudani’s	concept.	 Dis-instituting	 power,	 as	 understood	 in	 this	 article,	 is	 specifically	 related	 to	 the	rejuvenation	of	 the	civil	disobedience	 tradition	 today,	 irrespective	of	 its	 liberal	 roots,	and	 is	clearly	an	anti-institutional	proposition.		It	is	also	important	to	clarify	that	this	understanding	of	dis-instituting	power	is	not	to	be	confused	with	Giorgio	Agamben’s	notion	of	destituent	potential,	despite	 their	 resemblances.	This	 comes	 down	 to	 one	 simple,	 fundamental	 reason:	 Agamben	 conceives	 of	 destituent	potential	as	what	he	calls	pure	“inoperativity”.	By	inoperativity	he	does	not	mean	inertia,	but	rather	an	activity	capable	of	deactivating	both	the	legal	and	political	mechanisms,	which	are	marked	 by	 their	 inherent	 violence,	 freeing	 up	 these	 mechanisms	 for	 new	 utilizations.	Agamben	conceives	of	destitution	as	a	 reality	 that	has	no	 connection	 to	 institutions,	 i.e.,	 the	production	paradigm.	Thus,	inoperativity	means	“not	to	operate”;	that	is,	ceasing	production.	Within	this	idea	we	see	the	possibility	that	all	constituent	power	derives	from	the	original	sin	of	violence	and	the	division	between	an	ordered	dimension	–	archic	–	and	a	disordered	one	–	
anarchic.	 Based	 on	 this	 interpretation,	 Agamben	 presents	 the	 dualisms	 of	 potestas	 and	












characterization	 of	 the	 enemy,	 but	 rather	 with	 an	 attempt	 to	 order	 the	 contingency	 and	indeterminacy	typical	of	social	structures.	Thus,	political	action	involves	an	inherent	gamble.	That	is	the	true	tragic	nature	of	constituent	power.		Nevertheless,	as	previously	stated,	this	is	not	a	blind	bet.	If	constituent	power	is	based	on	indeterminacy	 and	 openness,	 and	 may	 therefore	 result	 in	 any	 social	 arrangement,	 some	possibly	worse	than	capitalism,	then	it	 is	necessary	to	guarantee	a	minimal	 level	of	security.	According	to	this	proposal,	confidence	in	this	risk	can	only	be	guaranteed	when	conceiving	of	–	and	practicing	–	 constituent	power	 in	 relation	 to	dis-instituting	power.	Unlike	 constituent	power,	dis-instituting	power	is	neither	open	nor	indeterminate,	but	actually	configured	by	the	reality	 it	 denies.	 The	 dis-instituting	 power	 is	 defined	 by	 existing	 institutions,	 continually	presenting	 an	 inversion.	 What	 the	 dis-instituting	 power	 dis-institutes	 is	 the	 minimal	 basis	upon	which	 the	 constituent	power	will	 start	 acting.	 Indeed,	 the	 constituent	power	 could	be	anything,	 apart	 from	 what	 has	 been	 denied	 by	 the	 dis-instituting	 power,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	coherent	 political	 project	 being	 at	 stake.	 Following	 a	 similar	 line	 of	 thought,	 Antonio	Negri	states	 that,	 currently,	 the	 constituent	 power	 should	 not	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 an	 empty	potentiality,	since	there	is	no	“inside”	and	“outside”	in	post-modernity:	every	political	force	is	closely	attached	 to	 the	present	historicity.	Thus,	 the	meanings	of	 the	constituent	power	will	always	 be	 determined	 by	 the	 resistances	 and	 singularities	 against	 which	 it	 collides	 (Negri,	2015,	p.	19).	Institutions	such	as	 the	State,	banks,	 stock	exchanges,	private	property,	 inheritance	and	contracts,	after	having	been	dis-instituted,	cannot	be	reconfigured	by	the	constituent	power,	whose	 infinite	malleability	will	 confront	 the	 limit	of	 the	order	previously	denied	by	 the	dis-instituting	power.	Thus,	 it	 is	possible	–	 though	not	without	risks	–	 to	seriously	consider	 the	wish	to	build	a	more	decent	society,	different	from	the	dis-instituted	one.	The	dis-instituting	power	 provides	 a	 guarantee	 against	 a	 return	 to	 capitalism,	 opening	 up	 a	 vast	 field	 of	possibilities	in	which	–	even	though	nothing	can	be	taken	for	granted	–	some	alternatives	are	necessarily	 excluded,	 having	been	proven	 to	be	unacceptable	 from	an	 ethical	 point	 of	 view.	For	example,	there	can	be	no	ethical	justification	for	subjugating	99%	of	humanity	to	the	1%	of	 individuals	 and	 companies	 which	 dominate	 political	 and	 economic	 power.	 Some	possibilities	have	also	been	proven	to	be	 inefficient	 from	the	point	of	view	of	productivity	–	free	 labor	produces	common	value	or	goods	 in	greater	quantity	and	with	more	quality	 than	capital	 can,	 as	 it	 is	nowadays	 limited	 to	an	unpredictable	valorization	of	 capital	 in	perverse	financial,	rentier	and	virtual	forms.		




campaign	against	the	whole	colonial	system	to	which	India	had	been	subjected	(Arendt,	1972,	p.	77;	Estévez	Araujo,	1994,	p.	28-29).		This	 situation	 demonstrates	 that	 civil	 disobedience,	 more	 than	 a	 self-correction	mechanism	 for	 constituted	 law,	 can	 work	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 constituent	 power	 put	 to	marching	 by	 a	 dis-instituting	 power,	 as	 seen	 above,	 since	 it	 exceeds	 the	 given	positive	 law,	presenting	itself	as	a	true	legal	source,	and	not	as	a	result	or	product	of	the	system.	For	civil	disobedience	 to	 fulfill	 this	 role,	 the	 presence	 of	 specific	 circumstances	 is	 needed;	 from	 the	point	of	view	of	 this	article,	 it	must	be	adequately	grounded	 in	a	 radical-democratic	 idea	of	law.	The	given	hypothesis	is	that	nowadays	these	circumstances	exist	in	the	form	of	a	state	of	
permanent	 economic	 exception.	 More	 than	 simply	 colonizing	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 economic	exception	has	transformed	it.	It	seems	that	a	point	of	no	return	has	been	reached,	resulting	in	the	rapid	dismantling	of	liberal	rights	and	guarantees.	Although	they	have	never	functioned	at	their	 maximum	 potential,	 like	many	 other	 human	 endeavors,	 liberal	 rights	 and	 guarantees	have	played	an	 important	historical	 role	by	partially	 voicing	 the	plight	of	 the	 exploited	and	oppressed	in	political	debate	and	experience.		It	is	important	to	underline	that	civil	disobedience	is	not	the	only	–	and	perhaps	not	even	the	most	 important	–	structure	through	which	the	constituent	power	expresses	 itself.	There	are	many	other	forms	of	expression,	both	passive	(such	as	a	revolutionary	general	strike)	and	active	(insurrection,	armed	resistance,	revolution,	etc.),	whose	objective	is	the	transformation	of	 the	 political-legal-economic	 system	 of	 exception	 as	 a	 whole.	 Many	 of	 these	 forms	 of	constituent	power	resort	to	violent	methods	which,	however,	are	not	illegitimate	per	se.	The	ideas	outlined	by	Schmitt	and	Benjamin	on	the	symbiosis	of	law	and	violence	cannot	be	overlooked.	Indeed,	the	normativity	we	are	now	familiar	with	stems	from	original	acts	of	land	 appropriation	 (Schmitt,	 1974),	 which	 were	 then	 justified	 through	 mythologizing	 and	moralizing	 metaphors.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 legal	 system	 monopolized	 the	 use	 of	 violence,	 now	understood	 to	 be	 the	 absolute	 property	 of	 law	 (Benjamin,	 1999).	 Nonetheless,	 one	 cannot	forget	the	historical	(and	not	ontological)	character	of	Schmitt’s	and	Benjamin’s	theses,	since	they	concern	a	specific	experience	of	 law	–	the	Western	one,	which	first	appeared	in	Greece	and	currently	manifests	 itself	as	capitalist	 law	based	on	appropriation	–	and	not	all	possible	legal	experience.	Power	 and	normativity,	 rather	 than	 violence	 and	hierarchy,	 are	 the	 key	 elements	 in	 all	legal	spheres.	If,	in	the	present	system,	these	dyads	are	often	mistaken	for	one	another,	this	is	due	to	the	identification	of	what	exists	–	capitalist	law	–	with	what	can	exist;	i.e.,	other	forms	of	 law.	 If	 we	 take	 Agamben’s	 invitation	 to	 “the	 coming	 generation”	 to	 conceive	 of	 a	 legal	paradigm	in	which	violence	is	genuinely	disabled,	then	civil	disobedience	stands	out	from	the	multiple	 constituent	 forms	 of	 this	 new	 legal	 experience	 precisely	 due	 to	 its	 non-violent	character.	 In	mystical	 terms,	 it	 does	not	 accumulate	karma,	 nor	activates	 the	mechanism	of	capitalist	 law	 –	 which	 always	 requires	 more	 violence	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 its	 grounds	 and	consequences.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 civil	 disobedience	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 radically	argumentative	 legal	 institution	 –	 more	 than	 any	 argumentation	 theory	 linked	 to	 the	constituted	powers,	which	are	violent	by	nature,	could	ever	admit.	Estévez	Araujo	classifies	the	traditional	conceptions	of	civil	disobedience	by	stating	that	one	can	either	understand	them	as	a	form	of	constitutional	review,	whereby	the	constitutional	validity	of	a	certain	law	is	directly	questioned	through	an	act	of	disobedience,	or	as	the	direct	
exercise	 of	 rights	 already	 recognized	 by	 the	 Constitution.	 This	 occurs,	 for	 example,	when	 the	disobedient	 ignore	 an	 official	 prohibition	 to	 protest	 and	 demonstrate.	 While	 constitutional	








so,	is	only	a	way	of	activating	the	power	which	rests	in	the	productive	and	reproductive	action	of	 a	 divided	 social	world.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 “undergoing	 a	 rebellion	 is	 not	 an	 effective	alternative	against	the	permanent	exception,	for	non-stop	rebelling	is	the	most	important	rule	imposed	by	such	exception”	(Valdencantos,	2014,	p.	156).	This	is	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	social	 struggles	 of	 2011-2013,	which	 spanned	 the	US,	 Latin	America	 and	Europe.	While	 the	explosion	of	popular	indignation	was	primarily	seen	as	legitimate,	it	was	soon	used	to	justify	an	 unprecedented	 deepening	 of	 the	 exception,	 at	 least	 in	 so-called	 “democratic”	 States.	 For	example,	due	to	the	notorious	Ley	Mordaza	in	Spain,	many	laws	and	administrative	measures	which	criminalized	the	public	questioning	of	the	capitalist	order	were	approved,	including	the	absurd	 violation	 of	 fundamental	 principles	 such	 as	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	 the	 due	process	of	law,	the	right	to	information,	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	right	to	protest.	In	Brazil,	this	process	was	particularly	clear.	After	the	shock	of	the	2013	protests,	when	a	series	 of	 acentric,	 horizontal	 and	 spontaneous	 movements	 took	 over	 the	 streets	 of	 major	Brazilian	cities,	hampered	the	progress	of	the	Confederations	Cup	and	prevented	an	increase	in	 public	 transport	 fares,	 the	 exceptional	 power	 was	 able	 to	 portray	 such	 movements	 as	symbols	of	barbarism	and	disorder,	 later	engineering	containment,	 intimidation	and	control	structures	 seldom	 experienced	 previously	 in	 the	 country.	 It	was	 thanks	 to	 these	 structures	that	the	World	Cup	took	place	in	Brazil	without	any	major	incidents.	However,	the	apparent	victory	 resulting	 in	 the	 retreat	 of	 the	 State	 and	 its	 economic	 partners	 from	 the	 increase	 in	public	transport	fares	in	2013	was	rapidly	reversed	in	2015,	and	this	time	the	media	did	not	report	 the	extreme	violence	used	by	 the	police	during	protests	 in	 São	Paulo,	Rio	de	 Janeiro	and	Belo	Horizonte.	In	just	a	few	days,	the	movement	was	discredited	and	integrated	into	the	triumphal	 narrative	 that	 the	 order	 produces	 about	 itself.	 In	 political	 life,	 as	 in	 physics,	 for	every	action	there	is	a	reaction,	but	in	terms	of	human	struggle	the	reaction	rarely	happens	in	the	same	direction,	and	its	intensity	is	far	from	being	proportional.	That	is	why	we	must	value	the	dis-instituting	and	constituent	potentialities	of	inaction,	as	proposed	by	civil	disobedience.	In	 the	 interpretation	 adopted	 in	 this	 article	 –	 according	 to	which	 constituent	 power	 is	closely	related	to	dis-instituting	power	–	civil	disobedience,	if	considered	beyond	the	limits	of	the	 traditional	 reformist	 and	 liberal	 interpretations,	 seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	most	 adequate	mechanisms	 for	 thinking	 and	 acting	 in	 a	 dis-instituting	 way.	 Additionally,	 it	 has	 a	 vitally	strategic	advantage:	it	is	not	violent.	Therefore,	civil	disobedience	cannot	be	directly	attached	to	the	forms	of	State-capital	action,	which	have	an	inherent	need	to	monopolize	violence.	Non-violence	is	central	to	the	success	of	disobedient	action	opposed	to	constituted	power,	since	 the	 violent	 practices	 of	 social	movements	with	 reasonable	 demands	 are	 only	 used	 to	justify	 the	 State’s	 most	 ruthless	 responses.	 The	 non-violent	 strategy	 does	 not	 only	 aim	 to	rouse	the	opponent’s	sense	of	morality	–	as	Gandhi	intended	–	but	also	attempts	to	turn	public	opinion	 against	 the	 State	 and,	 instead,	 favor	 the	 disobedient,	 who	 want	 to	 institute	 new	political	and	legal	structures	(Estévez	Araujo,	1994,	p.	26).	To	such	an	argumentative-strategic	perspective	one	needs	to	add	the	institutional	aspect,	according	to	which	the	use	of	violence	by	 resistance	 organizations	 is	 strictly	 prohibited	 within	 constitutional	 democracies	 (Ebert,	1988,	 p.	 93).	 The	 non-violent	 strategy	makes	 it	 easier	 for	 civil	 disobedience	 to	 be	 seen	 as	legitimate	in	the	context	of	the	constituted	power	it	wishes	to	criticize	and	overcome.			




consumption,	 debt	 and	 moral	 judgment	 which	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 lower	 classes,	 who	 are	continually	asked	to	resist	the	harmful	effects	of	the	permanent	economic	crisis	we	live	in.	By	questioning	the	alleged	continuum	between	 law	and	 justice,	disobedience	no	 longer	appears	as	an	individual	act	of	moralizing	character,	but	rather	as	a	collective	and	emancipatory	social	practice,	capable	of	constituting	new	forms	of	subjectivity	by	removing	the	subject	 from	the	desire-consumption-frustration	cycle	(Douzinas,	2015,	p.	175-176).	The	ontological	act	of	disobedience	need	not	be	organized	by	a	political	party,	labor	union	or	any	other	centralizing	structure,	being	rather	a	movement	centered	on	resistance	and	on	the	fight	for	the	right	to	have	rights.	It	is,	therefore,	the	political	starting	point	from	which	new	forms	of	 subjectivity	may	be	constituted	 (Douzinas,	2013).	 It	 is	vital	 to	 create	 restraint-free	ways	 to	 perceive	 our	 social	 reality	 and	 being	 in	 the	 world,	 dismantling	 proprietary	 and	hierarchical	forms	of	subjectivity	by	deactivating	the	institutions	which	reproduce	them	daily.	In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 this	 task,	 civil	 disobedience	 must	 play	 a	 central	 role.	 It	 must	 be	embodied	 not	 only	 within	 the	 abstract	 ideas	 discussed	 here,	 but	 within	 concrete	 actions:	abandoning	 work,	 promoting	 general	 strikes	 in	 public	 services,	 not	 paying	 taxes	 and	 fees,	abstaining	 from	 voting	 on	 a	 large	 scale,	 eschewing	 the	 banking	 system,	 increasing	 co-operativism,	etc.	In	contradiction	with	her	final	thesis,	Hannah	Arendt	indicates	that	civil	disobedience,	as	an	extra-legal	phenomenon,	has	effective	revolutionary	potential.	Having	noted	that	all	human	societies	change,	being	in	constant	flux	–	and	thus	in	need	of	stability	–	Arendt	states	that	the	law	 can	 bring	 stability	 and	 normalize	 such	 changes	 after	 they	 occur,	 but	 that	 the	 changes	themselves	result	 from	the	action	of	extralegal	potentialities	(Arendt,	1972,	p.	80);	 i.e.,	 from	something	 beyond	 the	 law,	 such	 as	 constituent	 power.	 Perhaps	 this	 is	 why	 –	 almost	unwillingly	 –	 she	 arrives	 at	 a	 conclusion	 very	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 developed	 in	 this	 article,	confirming	that	civil	disobedience	is	one	of	the	possible	answers	to	the	crisis	in	political	and	legal	 institutions.	 The	 state	 of	 economic	 exception	 has	 become	 the	 rule,	 and	 the	 daily	emergency	 created	 by	 disaster	 capitalism	 cannot	 be	 overcome	 by	 a	 new	 global	 nómos,	 as	predicted	 by	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 but	 rather	 by	 a	 deactivation	 that	 only	 the	 disobedient	 and	 his	radical	refusal	can	implement.		
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